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Abstract	  
Mega-events have been credited with being catalysts of urban regeneration and 
accelerating infrastructure development. Staging a mega-event not only requires significant 
investment in event-related facilities but also usually necessitates upgrades to transportation 
infrastructure. This paper broadly examines the role of mega-events in fast-tracking urban 
improvements as well as the ramifications of accelerated development on cities. In particular, it 
discusses how the 2015 Pan American Games held in Toronto fast-tracked the completion of the 
Union-Pearson Express, a rail link connecting the city’s downtown and primary airport, after the 
project had been stalled for years. This case study reveals the tensions between the long-term 
planning goals of the host city and more short-term demands for mega-events. The Union-
Pearson Express is criticized for being inconvenient, inaccessible and over-priced, resulting in 
adverse impacts on the environment and human health and not doing enough to encourage public 
transportation. This paper contends that the Union-Pearson Express offered short-term gain 
associated with the Pan American Games that fails to address the long-term transit and other 
needs of the Greater Toronto Area. It is very much short-term gain for the price of long-term 
pain. 	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Foreword	  	  
This Major Paper is the final piece needed to satisfy the requirements of the Plan of Study 
for receipt of a Master in Environmental Studies Program in Planning from the Faculty of 
Environmental Studies at York University. It is a culmination of the knowledge gained through 
coursework in the program that has provided me with a sound background in transportation 
planning, land use planning law, research methods, environmental planning and urban-regional 
planning. 
Titled “Cultural Considerations for Urban and Regional Planning,” the area of 
concentration in my Plan of Study focuses on understanding, conserving and utilizing the built 
cultural heritage in urban regions. This not only considers the importance of historic 
preservation, it also examines how new development projects can contribute to a city’s cultural 
notoriety. My research focuses on how new urban infrastructure built for mega-events can serve 
as a long-lasting cultural legacy for the host city. In particular, it examines the transport legacy of 
the 2015 Pan American Games held in Toronto, giving specific focus to the Union-Pearson 
Express project.  
This Major Paper has helped me achieve Component 2 and Learning Objective 2.1 from 
my Plan of Study which focuses on the theories, concepts, policies and practices involved in 
urban and regional planning. It examines the Union-Pearson Express project in the context of 
Ontario’s Regional Transportation Plan The Big Move, GO Transit’s strategic plan GO 2020, as 
well as environmental impact assessments as required by the province. This paper also 
contextualizes the Union-Pearson Express and the Pan American Games with prominent urban 
development process theories such as David Harvey’s theory of capital investment and its impact 
	   iii 
on urban areas, and Jamie Peck and Adam Tickell’s notion of mega-events as strategies for urban 
regeneration associated with post-Fordism and related transitions to a post-industrial society.  
This research paper also accomplishes Component 3 and Learning Objective 3.2 from my 
Plan of Study which examines the relationship between culture and economic development in an 
urban region. It discusses Toronto’s desire to host a mega-event in order to enhance its 
international reputation and achieve potential economic benefits such as increased tourism, local 
job creation and spinoff benefits to local businesses. These assumed benefits were seen to justify 
substantial public investment in infrastructure and transportation improvements, including the 
Union-Pearson Express. However, this paper concludes that important errors in planning mean 
that the project has not been successful in meeting longer-term objectives.  	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1.	  Introduction 
Mega-events such as the Olympics, the FIFA World Cup and the Pan American Games 
are short-term, high-profile events associated with prestige and global visibility that often cause 
large-scale transformations in cities and regions (Kassens-Noor, Wilson, Müller, Maharaj and 
Huntoon, 2015). Mega-events have been championed as instruments of long-term economic 
development and powerful tools for urban revitalization, regeneration and development. They 
require investing significant largely public funds to build the appropriate facilities and 
infrastructure to accommodate not only the event’s activities but also the influx of visitors for the 
duration of the event. The hosting of mega-events has been actively pursued by cities all over the 
world as a way to fast-track an urban regeneration agenda and stand out among the global 
competition for international capital (Silvestre, 2009).  
After several failed attempts to host the Olympics, Toronto finally got the chance to 
showcase itself to the western hemisphere by hosting its first mega-event—the 2015 Pan 
American Games. When the Pan American Sports Organization announced in November 2009 
that Toronto had won the bid to host the 2015 Pan American Games, supporters saw it as an 
opportunity to leverage economic investment, fast-track urban development, and attract tourists. 
Toronto and the surrounding region would need new and improved sports facilities, 
accommodations for the athletes and coaches, and most importantly, transit improvements to 
ensure that athletes and those attending the events could move efficiently from one venue to 
another. The Games provided fixed deadlines and accelerated the implementation of planned 
projects that would otherwise take much longer to complete. In little over five years, the Greater 
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Toronto Area experienced a massive investment in large-scale infrastructure development 
catalyzed by the Pan American Games. 
This paper examines the role of mega-events as catalysts for urban development in the 
cities that host them. It discusses transportation improvements as a key aspect associated with 
mega-events and the long-term implications of accelerated development. More specifically, it 
focuses on transportation infrastructure constructed for the 2015 Pan American Games in 
Toronto, using the Union-Pearson Express project as a case study. The need for a rail link 
between downtown Toronto and Pearson International airport has been recognized for decades, 
just as such a link is available in other major cities. This research paper focuses on the factors 
that stagnated the development process and how the Pan American Games helped to change the 
decision-making process that resulted in a rail link that should have been constructed many years 
ago. Lastly, the research assesses both the positive and negative implications of the Pan 
American Games accelerating the completion of the Union-Pearson Express and how the project 
addresses broader urban and regional planning objectives.  
The research methodology utilized for this paper is a substantive review of literature 
including academic articles, books, grey literature (such as government reports and planning 
policies), and other forms of published material. The review of academic and scholarly literature 
focuses on key documents regarding mega-events in relation to urban infrastructure 
development, specifically transportation improvements, and the lasting legacies left from these 
developments. News media sources are also examined such as newspaper articles, press releases, 
website information and blog posts to contribute up-to-date information about the Union-Pearson 
Express and public perception of the project. 
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This paper begins with a review of scholarly literature on the intersection of mega-events 
and mega-projects to provide the appropriate context for the relationship between the Pan 
American Games and the Union-Pearson Express. A description of the 2015 Pan American 
Games in Toronto is then provided, followed by an overview of the history, planning, and 
implementation of the Union-Pearson Express. While the Union-Pearson Express helped to meet 
the short-term objectives associated with the Pan American Games, the subsequent section 
criticizes it for missing longer-term opportunities to improve regional public transit in the 
Greater Toronto Area. It is criticized for being inconvenient, inaccessible, over-priced, and for 
adverse impacts on the environment and human health. The paper concludes with a speculative 
discussion on the future of mega-events in Toronto and for the Union-Pearson Express, as well 
as the lessons to be learned from the role of mega-events as catalysts for fast-tracking mega-
projects.  
 
2.	  On	  Mega-­‐Events	  and	  Mega-­‐Projects	  
Roche (2000, p. 1) defines mega-events as large-scale cultural (including commercial and 
sporting) events of mass popular appeal and international importance that are typically stage-
managed by a combination of national governmental and international non-governmental actors. 
Examples of sports-focused mega-events include the Olympics and the FIFA World Cup, which 
are of world-wide interest. The Pan American Games are of interest in the western hemisphere 
but still categorized as a mega-event. Such events are used to justify substantial public 
investment in new or improved infrastructure and event-related facilities. They often require 
repayment of long-term debt and always require long-term use-programming (Roche, 1994). 
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According to Essex and Chalkley (1998), mega-events have emerged as a significant catalyst for 
urban regeneration and can act as a key instrument of urban policy for their host cities. These 
events are attractive to host cities and countries seeking to rebuild infrastructure or promote a 
city brand (Kassens-Noor et al., 2015). 
The notion of using mega-events as an opportunity for urban change is important to 
understand within the context of wider changes in the urban economy. The contribution of these 
events to strategies for urban regeneration is strongly associated with post-Fordism and related 
transitions to a post-industrial society (Essex and Chalkley, 1998; Peck and Tickell, 1995). 
Harvey (1989) highlights the use of ‘urban spectacles’, such as mega-events, as a strategy for 
urban renewal, asserting that spectacles are seen as one of the main products and processes by 
which cities can express and redefine their image and promote its position on the global stage. 
The concept of spectacle is closely aligned with marketing the city to attract investment that will 
underpin the desired urban regeneration. 
Yet, mega-events often go hand-in-hand with mega-projects. Flyvbjerg (2014, p. 6) 
describes mega-projects as “large-scale, complex ventures that typically cost US$1-billion or 
more, take many years to develop and build, involve multiple public and private stakeholders, 
are transformational, and impact millions of people.” Examples of mega-projects include high-
speed rail lines, airports, seaports, large-scale signature architecture, national broadband, etc. 
Mega-events such as the Olympics can themselves be regarded as a mega-project when 
considering all of the money and preparations that goes into hosting the Games. Planning and 
managing the Olympics is a huge project in itself and very costly. The total estimated costs for 
the most recent Olympics including Games-related infrastructure are: Beijing 2008: $43 billion; 
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Vancouver 2010: $8.9 billion; London 2012: $13.9 billion; and Sochi 2014: $51 billion (Gibson, 
2013). 
Considerable investment in both event-related facilities and supporting infrastructure is 
required to host a mega-event, and these then become legacies to the host city when the event is 
over (Essex and Chalkley, 1998). In addition to the provision of new event facilities such as 
sports stadiums, concert halls and museums, mega-events have also acted as a stimulus for major 
urban developments such as new road systems, public transport initiatives, air terminals, urban 
renewal programs, tourist and cultural facilities, as well as parks and beautification projects 
designed to enhance the city’s landscape and environment (Essex and Chalkley, 1998). Mega-
events are often credited with providing additional funding resources, such as federal funds, that 
would otherwise be unavailable for planning initiatives (Lewis, 2014). However, Roche (1994) 
notes that the creation of infrastructure and event facilities often carries long-term debts and 
requires long-term use programming. Montreal’s hosting of the 1976 Summer Olympics incurred 
a debt of $600 million as the preparation time for the games coincided with a deteriorating 
Canadian economy and an international recession (Kidd, 1992). 
Large-scale infrastructure projects such as airport expansions, athletes’ villages, and 
public transportation systems are one of the costliest aspects of hosting a mega-event. For 
instance, the Vancouver Olympic Village for the 2010 Winter Olympic Games that housed 2,800 
athletes, coaches and officials cost CAN$1-billion. The construction of the Village, however, 
was not without its challenges. The 2008 economic crisis and a number of undisclosed local 
political commitments made completing the Vancouver Olympic Village very challenging 
(Scherer, 2011). Yet the project was an important one not only as a necessity for the Games but 
also because the history of the project dates back to the 1990s when municipal officials first 
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entered into a discussion to create a sustainable residential community on the Southeast Shore of 
False Creek, a former industrial area situated on prime waterfront land (Scherer, 2011). The 
Olympics served as an opportunity to accelerate a large-scale urban development project. 
Mega-events have been credited with significantly changing land-use patterns and the 
city’s infrastructure, particularly in terms of transport networks (Essex and Chalkley, 1998). 
Transportation improvement mega-projects are very commonly affiliated with mega-events. For 
example, the Beijing Capital International Airport for the 2008 Summer Olympic Games was the 
stimulus for a third terminal and runway at a cost of US$3.5 billion. This project was 
fundamental in relieving the existing congestion on the other two runways as well as 
accommodating the influx of visitors for the Olympics. According to Van Der Westhuizen 
(2007), mega-events and urban transport are intimately linked as transport constitutes the most 
visible demonstration of logistical success and is easily exposed to strong scrutiny and criticism.  
In many cases, mega-events have provided the justification for related developments to 
be fast-tracked through accelerated planning, design and construction. Essex and Chalkley 
(1998) note that city planners may see the hosting of a mega-event as an opportunity to fund and 
bring forward long-term plans that would otherwise remain in the pending file for many years. In 
this way, mega-events may be said to accelerate change rather than initiate it (Essex and 
Chalkley, 1998).  
According to a study by Flyvbjerg (2007), urban rail projects are one of riskiest types of 
mega-projects. The study examines 44 urban rail projects which are compared with 214 other 
transportation infrastructure projects. Flyvbjerg (2007) found that the average cost escalation for 
urban rail is 45 per cent in constant prices, and for 25 per cent of urban rail projects cost 
escalations are at least 60 per cent. Moreover, actual ridership on average is 51 per cent lower 
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than forecast, and for 25 per cent of urban rail projects actual ridership is at least 68 per cent 
lower than forecast.  
Cities often desire to host a mega-event for the perceived economic benefits involved. 
The event can promote economic activity as a result of the jobs created and because of the vast 
numbers of tourists visiting the city during the event. Yet the increases of employment in tourism 
related industries such as hotels and restaurants can be largely temporary and often disappear 
after the event finishes (Li and McCabe, 2013). On the other hand, mega-events can provide an 
opportunity to enhance a city’s image and reputation at-large, resulting in longer-term tourism 
benefits. Broadcasted globally and watched by millions of people, there is an impetus for the 
host city to appear attractive and desirable in the international spotlight. In the modern global 
economy where major cities compete for investment, mega-events represent a unique publicity 
platform and opportunity for place marketing (Essex and Chalkley, 1998). Moreover, the 
international spotlight on a host city could bring long-term tourism benefits through image 
enhancement (Ritchie and Smith, 1991). 
Mega-events can also accelerate urban development through the creation of infrastructure 
necessary to host the event. Even unsuccessful bids on an event can bring urban improvements 
and benefits to a city such as urban projects and regeneration initiatives in order to strengthen a 
city’s bid (Essex and Chalkley, 1998; Law, 1994). Yet Paddison (1993) and Roche (1994) note 
that the decision to bid is not necessarily democratic or based on a clear expression of public 
opinion. In many cases there is limited public consultation and the bid is fast-tracked with an 
incomplete evaluation of social and economic implications (Hall, 1992). Harvey (1989) argues 
that heightened inter-urban competition, such as bidding for a mega-event, can produce socially 
wasteful investments and consequently exacerbate rather than ameliorate urban problems. Hiller 
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(1990) contends that the average citizen receives relatively little tangible or direct benefit from a 
city hosting an event and may even experience extra costs. These extra costs can emerge through 
increased taxes raised in order to finance event-related infrastructure, the destruction or 
disturbance of existing communities through building projects, and from increased housing costs 
resulting from gentrification (Essex and Chalkley, 1998).  
The	  mega-­‐project	  boom	  
Mega-projects are growing in popularity, being built in ever greater numbers at ever 
greater value (Flyvbjerg, 2014). The McKinsey Global Institute (2013) estimates that global 
infrastructure spending will be US$3.4-trillion per year between 2013 and 2030, or 
approximately 4 per cent of the total global gross domestic product, mainly delivered as large-
scale projects. The accelerated pace to which spending on large-scale infrastructure is taking 
place is well illustrated by China between 2004 and 2008. In those five years the country spent 
more on infrastructure in real terms than during the entire 20th century (Flyvbjerg, 2014). In 
those same years China built as many kilometres of high-speed rail as Europe did in two decades 
(Flyvbjerg, 2014), even though Europe was also extraordinarily busy building this type of 
infrastructure such as the Channel Tunnel (Eurostar) railway connecting London to Paris that 
opened in 1994. Flyvbjerg (2014) asserts that there has never been a time in the history of 
mankind where infrastructure spending has been this high. The Economist (2008, p. 37) calls it 
“the biggest investment boom in history” with over half of the world’s infrastructure investment 
now taking place in emerging economies. The following image forecasts how much will be 
invested in emerging economies, where this investment is expected to take place and the type of 
infrastructure being built. 
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Forecasting infrastructure mega-projects in emerging economies  
(Source: The Economist, 2008, p. 37) 
 
Flyvbjerg (2014) notes that infrastructure mega-projects have proved to be remarkably 
recession proof as the 2008 recession actually helped the mega-projects industry grow. The 
notion of mega-projects being recession proof corresponds with Harvey’s (1978) theory of 
capital investment and its impact on urban areas in his article, “The urban process under 
capitalism: a framework for analysis.” Based on Marxist concepts of the contradictions of 
capitalism and the dynamics of accumulation, Harvey (1978) posits that investment in the built 
environment is perceived in relation to the different forms of crisis that may arise under 
capitalism. Harvey’s model of capital investment encompasses the primary circuit of capital 
(production), the secondary circuit of capital (the built environment), and the tertiary circuit of 
capital (social investment, and science and technology). The primary circuit has a tendency for 
“overaccumulation” meaning that too much capital is produced in aggregate relative to the 
opportunities to employ that capital. This manifests itself as overproduction (a glut on the 
market), idle productive capacity, the surplus and/or exploitation of labour power, and the falling 
rates of profit. This tendency towards overaccumulation can be overcome, at least temporarily, 
by switching capital into the secondary or tertiary circuits.  
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Harvey (1978) further explains that the investment in these circuits is done for the sole 
purpose of capital gains and has nothing to do with the real needs of the people. Shifting 
investment from primary to secondary and tertiary circuits does not eliminate the tendency 
towards overaccumulation, rather it increases the likelihood of over-investment in the secondary 
and tertiary circuits of capital. In these circuits, chronic overproduction results in devaluation of 
fixed capital and consumption fund items – a process that affects both the built environment and 
the producer and consumer durables. These tendencies can cause crisis in the capitalist mode of 
production. Harvey (1978) notes that the global crisis of capitalism in the 1930s and 1970s was 
in fact preceded by the massive movement of capital into long-term investment in the built 
environment as a kind of last hope for finding productive uses for rapidly overaccumulating 
capital. Based on historical data in Britain and the United States, Harvey (1978) examines the 
‘long-waves’ of investment in the built environment and the strong relationship between these 
waves and fluctuations in the money supply and in the structure of capital markets. 
While Harvey’s theory of the urban process under capitalism asserts that market 
conditions that stimulate investment in the built environment, Flyvbjerg (2014) presents “four 
sublimes” that drive mega-projects and make them attractive to decision makers. These sublimes 
are technological, political, economic, and aesthetic.  
The technological sublime refers to pushing the boundaries of what technology can do. It 
is regarded as the enthusiasm of engineers and technologists to build large and innovate projects 
such as building the tallest building, the longest bridge, the fastest train, the largest wind turbine, 
or the first of anything (Flyvbjerg, 2014). 
The second sublime is the political sublime described as the rapture politicians get from 
building mega-projects as monuments to themselves and their causes, and from the visibility this 
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generates with the public and media (Flyvbjerg, 2014). Mega-projects are media magnets and 
often a lot of attention is given to the politician responsible for initiating the project, putting him 
or her in the limelight for being pro-active. This type of public exposure helps get politicians re-
elected and so therefore, they actively seek out mega-projects while in office (Flyvbjerg, 2014). 
Van Der Westhuizen (2007, p. 344) also identifies mega-projects as being political symbols 
stating that massive infrastructure projects “often feed into, as much as they are part of, the 
state’s marketing power.” This marketing power internally refers to the ways in which state and 
corporate elites shore up legitimacy and reinforce a sense of national identity while performing a 
fundamental role in terms of global signalling externally (Van Der Westhuizen, 2007). 
Flyvbjerg’s (2014) third sublime driving mega projects is economic and refers to the 
delight business people and trade unions get from making money and jobs generated from mega-
projects. Mega-projects create and sustain employment and since they usually have enormous 
budgets, there are ample funds available for all to go around including engineers, contractors, 
architects, consultants, investors, developers, lawyers, construction workers, bankers, 
landowners, etc. (Flyvbjerg, 2014).  
The fourth and final sublime is aesthetic and is explained as the pleasure designers and 
people who appreciate good design get from building, using, and looking at something very large 
that is also iconic and beautiful (Flyvbjerg, 2014). Examples of mega-projects marvelled for their 
design include the Golden Gate Bridge in San Francisco or Sydney’s Opera House. 
Justifying a mega-project by using one of the four sublimes can lead to inherent risks 
being overlooked or glossed over. Success of a mega-project is typically defined as being 
delivered on budget, on time, and with the promised benefits. Flyvbjerg (2014, p. 11) states, 
“[i]f, as the evidence indicates, approximately one out of ten mega-projects is on budget, one out 
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of ten is on schedule, and one out of ten delivers the promised benefits, then approximately one 
in one thousand projects is a success, defined as “on target” for all three.” There are many risks 
involved with undertaking a mega-project. These risks manifest in misinformation about costs, 
schedules, and benefits throughout project development and the decision making process. The 
result is cost overruns, delays, and benefit shortfalls that undermine project viability during 
project implementation and operations (Flyvbjerg, 2014).  
Decision making, planning, and management for mega-projects are typically multi-actor 
processes involving multiple stakeholders, both public and private, and often with conflicting 
interests (Aaltonen and Kujala, 2010). Public-private partnerships (PPPs) have gained popularity 
since the 1980s with governments as a means of effectively delivering large-scale transportation 
infrastructure projects (Siemiatycki, 2010). According to Siemiatycki (2010, p. 44), 
“[p]roponents suggest that using PPPs to introduce private financing, competition, and market 
forces into the procurement of public infrastructure can lead to projects being built sooner than 
they would be if entirely paid for by governments, reduce project lifecycle costs through greater 
innovation, introduce more accountable decision making, and reduce construction cost 
escalations that have consistently plagued infrastructure mega-projects.” The proponents further 
argue that the private sector is more efficient at allocating resources, and in particular, providing 
both infrastructure and services at lower costs, while also assuming the risks associated with 
development (Vining, Boardman, and Poschmann, 2005). Although the private sector is 
responsible for investing in the project, there are still risks borne by the government including 
contracting, monitoring, and negotiating costs (Vining et al., 2005). Vining et al. (2005) suggests 
that public and private sectors often have conflicting goals and consequently these mixed 
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enterprises can result in ‘the worst of both worlds,’ achieving neither high profitability nor 
worthwhile social goals. 
 
3.	  The	  Pan	  American	  Games	  
The Pan American Games (Pan Am Games) is a major sporting event in the Americas in 
which thousands of athletes participate in a variety of summer sports competitions. It is held 
every four years in the year before the Summer Olympic Games. The Pan Am Games are 
governed by the Pan American Sports Organization, whose structure and actions are defined by 
the Olympic Charter. Since 2007, host cities have been contracted to manage both the Pan 
American and the Parapan American Games, in which athletes with physical disabilities compete 
with one another. The Parapan American Games are held immediately following the Pan 
American Games. 
Toronto	  hosts	  in	  2015	  
The most recently held Pan and Parapan American Games, officially called the XVII Pan 
American Games, were held in Toronto in the summer of 2015. The Games went from July 10 to 
26 with preliminary rounds in certain events beginning on July 7. The Parapan American Games 
followed from August 7 to 15. The Toronto Pan American/Parapan American (collectively 
referred to as the Pan Am Games) hosted 6,132 athletes from 41 countries across the Americas. 
There were more than 30 competition venues across 16 municipalities—10 of these were newly 
built facilities and 15 were renovated to stage the events. Preparations for the Pan Am Games 
began taking place after Toronto had won the bid to host in November 2009. In addition to 
venues in Toronto, the other municipalities to host games were Ajax, Caledon, Hamilton, 
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Innisfil, Markham, Milton, Minden, Mississauga, Mono, Oro-Medonte, Oshawa, Palgrave, St. 
Catharines, Whitby, and Welland. Never before had Canada hosted a multi-sport event of this 
size, hosting more athletes than the Vancouver, Calgary and Montreal Olympics (Peterson, 
2014). 
 
The 2015 Pan American Games in Toronto 
(Source: Photo by Julio Cortez, National Post, 2015) 
 
Bidding	  and	  Budgeting	  
Toronto’s interest in bidding for the Pan Am Games came after recent unsuccessful bids 
to host the 1996 and 2008 Summer Olympics, which were held in Atlanta and Beijing 
respectively. Toronto, with the support of other communities in the Greater Golden Horseshoe, 
submitted its official bid book document to the Pan American Sports Organization on May 27, 
2009. The other cities bidding in competition against Toronto to host the Games were Lima, Peru 
and Bogotá, Colombia. On November 6, 2009 it was announced that Toronto had won the bid to 
host the 2015 Pan American Games. Toronto had won the absolute majority of votes after just 
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one round of voting by the Pan American Sports Organization Executive Committee, which 
reported favouring Toronto for its experience in staging multiple sporting events, government 
guarantees, security, safety, and cleanliness.  
While many were excited that Toronto would be hosting its first mega-event, as the 
Games approached the media reported a lack of enthusiasm by Toronto residents and lacklustre 
ticket sales (Sachgau, 2015). Residents were described as indifferent and apathetic towards the 
Pan Am Games and sometimes antagonistic due to excessive costs, traffic disruptions and the 
fact that “Canada is a country where winter sports predominate, and the Pan Am Games have 
never been of immense interest” (quoted in Flack, 2015). As one reporter put it, “[i]n Toronto’s 
fierce desire to be a world class city, the Pan Am Games are viewed as a consolation prize to 
previous unsuccessful Olympic bids” (quoted in Flack, 2015). 
The budget for the Games was originally set at $1.43 billion, with a cost-sharing plan 
stipulating that the provincial and federal governments each contribute 35 per cent of the 
funding, or $500 million each. This left the City of Toronto, other hosting partners, and games 
revenue to pay the remaining 30 per cent of the costs (Piercy, 2009). This budget covered only 
core expenses such as constructing sporting venues and running the games. However, the 
province added a series of other projects at extra costs. Additional projects include a new $146 
million stadium in Hamilton that hosted soccer games during Pan Am and the $709 million 
athletes’ village in the West Don Lands neighbourhood near Toronto harbour used to house over 
10,000 competitors and coaches (Morrow, 2013). Now that the Pan Am Games have ended the 
stadium in Hamilton has become the new home of the Canadian Football League’s Tiger Cats 
and the buildings in the athletes’ village are being converted to condominiums, social housing, 
and college dormitories. Ontario’s extra costs also included transportation costs and part of the 
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security budget which turned out to be higher than initially estimated (Morrow, 2013). The total 
cost ended up being $2.5 billion, nearly a billion dollars more than the budget set in 2009 and the 
highest ever spent on the Pan Am Games. The budget breakdown for the Pan American Games is 
summarized in the following illustration. 
 
 
Budget breakdown for Toronto Pan American Games 
(Source: Alcoba, National Post, 2015) 
 
In the $2.5 billion budget, $61 million was spent on transportation, which did not include 
the Union-Pearson Express. The transportation budget included initiatives to help reduce 
congestion with the influx of visitors during the Pan Am Games including the designation of 
high-occupancy vehicle (HOV) lanes, adding temporary Games routes, coordinating bus 
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schedules, wayfinding signage, and venue parking. Also included was a $3.5 million investment 
from the province in Pan/Parapan Am Trails to help create a continuous trail of more than 2,000 
kilometres and connect communities from Ottawa to Windsor and Fort Erie to Huntsville in time 
for the Games.  
 
4.	  The	  Union-­‐Pearson	  Express	  Rail	  Link	  
One of the major infrastructure projects built for the Pan Am Games was the Union-
Pearson Express, a rail link connecting Toronto’s downtown with Lester B. Pearson International 
Airport. While there has been interest in a project of this nature since the late 1980s (see below 
section for more information), it was only when Toronto won the bid in 2009 to host the 2015 
Pan Am Games that a clear deadline for implementation was created. Building the Union-
Pearson Express was considered to be a fundamentally important piece of infrastructure that 
would be necessary to accommodate the influx of visitors not only during the Games, but also to 
accommodate a growing population in the Greater Toronto Area. Former Ontario Premier Dalton 
McGuinty announced that the construction of the Union-Pearson Express would begin in the 
spring of 2012 and would open just in time for the Pan Am Games. He said, “For so many 
people this is the first impression they get of our province and our country. Being able to get to 
the centre of our largest city in a fast, efficient way is part of that very first impression” (quoted 
in O’Toole, 2011).  
The Union-Pearson Express (also referred to as UP Express or UPX) is a rail link 
connecting two of Toronto’s busiest transportation hubs – Lester B. Pearson International 
Airport in Mississauga and Union Station in downtown Toronto, making two intermediate stops 
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at Bloor and Weston GO stations. The passenger train service travels 23.3 kilometres between 
Union and Pearson Airport at a speed of 90 kilometres per hour departing every 15 minutes from 
5:30 a.m. to 1:00 a.m., seven days a week. The price for a one-way adult fare between Union 
Station and Pearson Airport is $27.50, or $19.00 with a Presto card. Union-Pearson Express is a 
division of Metrolinx, the Ontario government agency that manages and integrates transportation 
in the Greater Toronto and Hamilton Area. The trains began operation on June 6, 2015, which 
was just in time for the 2015 Pan American Games starting on July 10. The rail service is 
expected to remove 1.2 million car trips from roads across the region in the first year of 
operation alone and forecasted to carry 2.35 million passengers a year by 2018 (Government of 
Ontario, 2015a).  
 
 
Union-Pearson Express Route Map  
(Source: Union-Pearson Express, 2015) 
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History	  of	  airport	  rail	  link	  
For a city as large and developed as Toronto, it has been surprising to both residents and 
visitors that a passenger transportation link from the city centre to the airport only opened in June 
2015. Nevertheless there has been interest in improving transit connections to Pearson Airport 
since at least the late 1980s. This interest is exemplified by three formal studies that were 
released in 1989, 1990, and 1991 (Metrolinx, 2009):  
Transit Access to Lester B. Pearson International Airport final Report (July 1989)  
The purpose of the study was to develop and evaluate options for better 
integration between regional and local public transit and the intra-airport transit system. 
Undertaken by the Toronto Area Coordinating Office of the Ministry of Transportation, 
the report identified options for improved transit access to the airport made possible by 
expansion of local and regional transit services and provided input to the planning of 
regional gateway facilities in the general area. 
Overview of a GO Transit Connection, Pearson International Airport to Downtown 
Toronto (February 1990) 
The study investigated the potential to provide access to Pearson Airport through 
a connection on the GO Georgetown corridor. Prepared for the Special Advisor to the 
Premier Waterfront Development, the study provided an assessment of different types of 
transit technology and operational strategies, the general upgrading requirements for the 
corridor, and options for a connection from the GO Georgetown corridor to the airport 
terminals.  
Lester B. Pearson and Area Transportation Study, Subway Connection – Kipling Station 
to Lester B. Pearson Airport Review Paper (November 1991) 
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Prepared for the Ontario Ministry of Transportation, the purpose of the paper was 
to provide a broad review of two corridors, Highway 427 and the Richview-Manby hydro 
corridor, which could be used for a future transit link between Kipling Station on the 
TTC Bloor subway line and Pearson Airport. 
Call	  for	  a	  Public-­‐Private	  Partnership	  
In June 2000, then Minister of Transport David M. Collenette announced Transport 
Canada’s intention to pursue a rapid passenger rail service between Pearson Airport and Union 
Station then referred to as the Air Rail Link. Transport Canada issued a request for expressions 
of interest in April 2001 in order to assess private sector interest and a potential partnership with 
the government to finance, develop, design, build, operate, and maintain the Air Rail Link 
(Transport Canada, 2001). The Air Rail Link would not only ease existing transit congestion but 
also strengthen Toronto’s bid at the time to host the 2008 Summer Olympic Games (Canadian 
News Facts, 2000).  
Private sector respondents were asked to outline a vision for the Air Rail Link and 
comment on how it relates to the objectives and vision of Transport Canada. The following eight 
objectives formed Transport Canada’s vision for the rail link (Transport Canada, 2001, p. 2):  
1. Increase mobility by providing a transportation service that is safe, accessible, convenient, 
comfortable and that meets the needs of the public; 
2. Provide a seamless and rapid passenger rail service between Union Station and Lester B. Pearson 
International Airport; 
3. Reduce road congestion by enhancing the movement of passengers and freight on existing rail 
corridors; 
4. Provide an efficient and environmentally responsible passenger service and improve health by 
reducing greenhouse gas emissions; 
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5. Complement existing public transit systems and support intermodal transportation options within the 
GTA; 
6. Contribute to the economic development and well-being of the GTA; 
7. Promote the use of Intelligent Transportation Systems; and 
8. Employ a public-private partnership approach to avoid the use of public funds. 
 
Though Toronto lost the bid to host the 2008 Summer Olympics to Beijing, federal 
support for the air rail link did not diminish. After expressions of interest were received, 
Transport Canada issued a request for business cases on May 23, 2003 to four qualified consortia 
including infrastructure construction companies, and real estate and property development firms:  
• GTA LRT Consortium (Aecon Group Inc. and Alstom Canada Inc.);  
• Macquarie North America Ltd. and Arup Canada Inc.;  
• Pearl Consortium (Bombardier Inc., AMEC E&C Services Inc., in collaboration with 
strategic partners Hatch Mott MacDonald Ltd. and IBI Group); and  
• Union Pearson Group Inc. (SNC-Lavalin Engineers & Constructors Inc., PCL 
Constructors Canada Inc., Kilmer Van Nostrand Company Ltd., OMERS Realty 
Corporation, Jones Lang LaSalle Real Estate Services Inc., O&Y Properties 
Corporation). 
The four consortia were asked to prepare a business case that outlines the scope of the work that 
will need to be undertaken to finance, design, construct, operate, and maintain the air-rail link 
and set out the terms and conditions stipulated by eleven stakeholders for their involvement in 
the project (Transport Canada, 2003). These stakeholders were GO Transit, the Canadian 
National (CN) Railway Company, VIA Rail Canada, Greater Toronto Airports Authority, 
Ontario Ministry of Transportation, Region of Peel, City of Toronto, City of Mississauga, the 
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Toronto and Region Conservation Authority, Orlando Corporation, and Woodbine Entertainment 
Group (Transport Canada, 2003). 
Union	  Pearson	  AirLink	  Group	  
The four business proposals went through a “thorough and fair evaluation process,” 
which included public and private sector evaluators such as representatives of Transport Canada, 
the Canadian Transportation Agency, the Railway Association of Canada, the City of Toronto, 
the Greater Toronto Airports Authority, Canadian National Railway, GO Transit, and Deloitte & 
Touche, who acted as advisors to Transport Canada on this project (Transport Canada, 2003). On 
November 13, 2003 it was announced that the Union Pearson AirLink Group, an SNC-Lavalin 
subsidiary, was selected as the successful respondent to the request for business cases. 
The proposed service was called Blue22, as a trip would take 22 minutes to get to or from 
Pearson Airport with one stop in between at the Bloor GO/Dundas West TTC Station. It would 
run from Union Station along CN Rail's existing Weston corridor shared with GO Transit 
commuter services with a new 3.2 kilometre branch line constructed to take trains directly into 
the airport area (Briginshaw, 2005). Blue22 was not meant to compete with public transit but 
rather was designed to complement existing transit services by attracting additional ridership to 
both the TTC and GO Transit’s services (Transport Canada, 2003). The plan was to have train 
service operate 19 hours a day, seven days a week with departures every 15 minutes. It was 
estimated that the frequent service of the proposed air-rail link would remove between 5,000 and 
10,000 cars from Toronto's road system each day (Transport Canada, 2003). The trains were to 
be refurbished self-propelled Budd Rail Diesel Cars containing new engines, systems, and 
interiors. Blue22 passenger service was anticipated to start running as early as 2008 with a one-
way fare expected to cost $20 (Transport Canada, 2003). The cost of the project was estimated at 
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$200 million which included the design and construction of the 3.2 kilometre spur line, amenities 
at Union and Bloor Stations, a new station at the airport's new terminal, and the purchase of a 
fleet of eleven diesel units (Briginshaw, 2005). GO Transit selected SNC-Lavalin to conduct the 
environmental assessment for the section of the track between Bathurst Street and Bramalea, 
where GO’s Georgetown line and the Blue22 high-speed rail link were to share corridor space. 
Co-funded by the federal and provincial governments, the assessment was expected to be 
completed by the end of 2005 and became the subject of considerable public controversy.  
Work on SNC-Lavalin’s Blue22 project continued quietly through 2004 and 2005, which 
led to suspicions that the deal was being snuck past local communities (Bow, 2015). Residents in 
the old village of Weston, around Lawrence Avenue, were particularly alarmed over reports that 
railway crossings (the intersection where a railway line crosses a road or path) would be blocked 
off and the neighbourhood would effectively be split in two by the line. They were concerned 
that the proposed rail line would cause property values in the area to decline and create negative 
noise and safety impacts as well as dead-end neighbourhood roads. The fact that Blue22 would 
be using diesel trains as opposed to a more environmentally friendly option was also a matter of 
contention, as residents feared that the frequent rail service would consequently result in an 
increase of air pollution in the neighbourhood. Moreover, they considered SNC-Lavalin to be in 
a conflict of interest because the company was conducting the environmental assessment for the 
project despite its triple role as the owner, developer, and operator of the proposed rail line.  
Concern over the environmental impact assessment process was addressed at GO 
Transit’s board of directors meeting in April 2005. SNC-Lavalin executive Albert Sweetnam 
reviewed the project for the board and maintained that SNC-Lavalin’s staff is qualified to carry 
out the environmental assessment. He stated that the assessment process would be subject to 
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scrutiny from dozens of stakeholders, including federal and provincial ministries, municipalities, 
and other groups, adding that “a private agenda is not possible in such a regulated process” 
(quoted in Eligh, 2005a, p. 5). GO Transit managing director Gary McNeil supported 
Sweetnam’s position. For McNeil, “The EA [environmental assessment] process puts everything 
on the table for scrutiny and ensures that there is no skewing of the facts… [adding] If GO had 
the expertise in-house, we would be doing the work ourselves” (quoted in Eligh, 2005a, p. 5). 
GO Transit board members called for a peer-review of the environmental impact 
assessment. Board members including Mississauga mayor Hazel McCallion said, “I’m not 
questioning SNC’s ability to do the job, but there is a conflict… When the public questions 
conflict there should be an investigation. The only way out is a peer review, whatever it costs” 
(quoted in Eligh, 2005a, p. 5). Hamilton mayor Larry Di Ianni and Halton Region chair Joyce 
Savoline supported McCallion’s call for a review. Di Ianni said, “As a board, we should not be 
taking advice from a group with such a vested interest”, while Savoline opined that whether or 
not there was actually a conflict of interest, a peer review is necessary to lift the cloud of 
suspicion around the environmental impacts assessment from the public (quoted in Eligh, 2005a, 
p. 5). Representatives from local Business Improvement Area and ratepayer groups who attended 
the meeting raised additional concerns about the environmental assessment process, charging 
that SNC-Lavalin did not provide adequate notice, and has failed to present a full range of 
possible options for the proposal, such as the required inclusion of a ‘do nothing’ option (Eligh, 
2005a).  
Community opposition in Weston was so strong that a public information meeting held in 
March 2005 had to be shut down by the fire marshal when an estimated 1,500 local residents 
tried to cram into the 400-person capacity Bethel Apostolic Church to hear what the developers 
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had to say about the project (Eligh, 2005b). A new meeting was scheduled for April 28 at the 
much larger 2,200-seat Faith Sanctuary on Jane Street. On the night of the meeting, every seat 
was filled (Bow, 2015). Residents demanded that major roadways including Weston’s Church, 
John and King Streets be kept open across the railway tracks. In response, SNC-Lavalin 
proposed that only John Street be closed to vehicles and that a pedestrian bridge will be built for 
access to the local farmers’ market while also offering a new stop to serve Weston itself (Bow, 
2015). As the controversy over the environmental impact assessment continued, GO Transit 
made the promise to retain outside consultants do a peer review of the assessment and 
recommendations of the project to answer some of the concerns raised by the public. However, 
progress on the project significantly slowed down over the next few years as community 
opposition continued. Progress also slowed down when the Conservatives led by Stephen Harper 
defeated the Liberal government in 2006, which had been the primary backer of the project. 
Rather, the provincial government had an increasing interest in building a rail link to the airport 
as part of bigger plans for expanded GO Transit service as explained below. 
Metrolinx	  and	  The	  Big	  Move	  Plan	  
On April 24, 2006, the Government of Ontario created Metrolinx, an agency with the 
mandate to improve the coordination and integration of all modes of transportation in the Greater 
Toronto and Hamilton area. Originally called the Greater Toronto Transportation Authority, the 
named was changed to Metrolinx in 2007 and a Regional Transportation Plan called The Big 
Move: Transforming Transportation in the Greater Toronto and Hamilton Area was launched in 
September 2008. Metrolinx merged with GO Transit in May 2009 making GO an operating 
division of Metrolinx. 
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Transit corridors for access to Pearson Airport  
(Source: Metrolinx, 2008, p. 24) 
 
The Metrolinx Regional Transportation Plan, The Big Move, is a 25-year, $50 billion plan 
for coordinated, integrated transportation and transit in the Greater Toronto and Hamilton Area. 
The Plan identifies the need to establish a dedicated link between downtown Toronto and 
Pearson Airport. More specifically, the Plan’s second priority action (Big Move #2) calls for the 
need for the development of “high-order transit connectivity to the Pearson Airport from all 
directions, including a multi-purpose, fast transit link to downtown Toronto” (Metrolinx, 2008). 
The Big Move Plan identifies Union Station and Pearson Airport as two of the most significant 
mobility hubs in the Greater Toronto and Hamilton Area as tens of thousands of travellers pass 
through them every day, and over half a million combined jobs are located within less than four 
kilometres of these hubs (Metrolinx, 2008). Yet, less than one per cent of all travellers at Pearson 
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Airport arrive by public transit (Metrolinx, 2008). In addition to plans for building a direct rail 
link between the hubs, The Big Move Plan identifies transit corridors in all directions for access 
to Pearson Airport: from the east along the Eglinton Avenue corridor; from the north via the 
Finch Avenue transit corridor; from the west via the Highway 403 Transitway and via the Queen 
Street/Highway 427 corridor; and from the south via Highway 427 from Kipling Station 
(Metrolinx, 2008).  
Public-­‐Private	  Partnership	  	  
The private sector worked on the infrastructure design and the original business model to 
develop it further into a dedicated airport link, as it was an instrumental part of the City of 
Toronto’s bid for the 2015 Pan/Parapan American Games (Metrolinx, 2014a). By 2008 there had 
not been significant progress on the project due to failed consensus in negotiations, regulatory 
hurdles, and the ongoing opposition from communities along the rail corridor. With Metrolinx’s 
Regional Transportation Plan calling for improved transit connectivity to and from Pearson 
Airport, the province entered into negotiations with the Union Pearson AirLink Group for a 
public-private partnership. The Ontario government revised the environmental impact 
assessment process in June 2008 making Metrolinx the proponent of a new environmental 
impact assessment review that would simultaneously assess a combination of both the Union-
Pearson rail link and GO Transit’s Georgetown South expansion. The province allowed for the 
environmental assessment to be done in just six months whereas it usually requires three years. 
The final Environmental Project Report was released on July 30, 2009. 
The role of the province became even more prominent in the rail link project when in 
April 2009, GO Transit purchased the Weston railway subdivision from the privatized CN 
Railway for $160 million (GO Transit and CN Railway Company, 2009). The line runs roughly 
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from the Strachan Avenue grade crossing to the junction with the CN York subdivision at Steeles 
Avenue. The acquisition of the corridor aligned with GO Transit’s Strategic Plan, GO 2020, to 
add more service, build new infrastructure, and expand its operations along that line. GO 2020 is 
a strategic plan released in 2008 outlining the vision, objectives and goals, and service strategy 
for GO Transit to the year 2020. The purchase of the Weston subdivision brought the corridor to 
be used by Blue22 under provincial, rather than private, control. 
In 2009, the private sector pulled out of the agreement for the Air Rail Link citing the 
global economic downturn, fearing it would be unable to raise the financing needed to deliver the 
project (Metrolinx, 2014a). The Ministry of Transportation and Metrolinx thereafter assessed the 
feasibility of taking over the responsibility for the project and in 2010, the provincial government 
reassigned the responsibility of the project to Metrolinx. With Toronto winning the bid in 2009 
to host the 2015 Pan American Games, a clear deadline for the project completion had been 
created. The project was subsequently reconfigured to be delivered in three phases: the plan and 
design phase from mid-2010 to mid-2012, the build phase starting in mid-2012 to March 2015, 
and finally the operation phase from April 2015 onwards (Metrolinx, 2014a). Metrolinx also 
established a new operating division for the project that would become the Union-Pearson 
Express. 
Rebranding	  and	  Construction	  
Formerly referred to as the Air Rail Link, Metrolinx unveiled that the new official name 
for the project was the Union-Pearson Express, on November 29, 2012 (Metrolinx, 2012). 
Metrolinx largely followed the same project scope that had been previously approved in the 
environmental impact assessment, with the service designed for air travellers rather than 
conventional commuters. Changes from SNC-Lavalin’s former proposal included stops at both 
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Weston and Bloor GO Stations and other refinements to take into account synergies with GO 
Transit. 
On October 24, 2011, Metrolinx awarded AirLinx Transit Partners, a consortium 
comprising some of Canada’s biggest construction companies including Aecon Construction and 
Materials Ltd. and Dufferin Construction Co., the contract to build the three kilometre spur line 
that would break away from the Kitchener GO tracks and run to the airport. The connection 
started just west of Highway 427 and follows the sides of Highways 427 and 409 before rising 
onto an elevated guideway weaving through the Pearson Airport access roads to a new stop atop 
Terminal 1. Construction of the spur line and passenger station at Pearson Airport began in the 
spring of 2012 at a cost of $128.6 million, with the entire project costing $456 million to build 
and another $68 million annually to operate it (Ferguson, 2011). 
While the Union-Pearson Express was considered of utmost importance for 
accommodating the influx of visitors during the Pan Am Games, the project was not part of the 
budget for the event. Rather, the construction of the Union-Pearson Express was undertaken as 
part of GO Transit’s Georgetown South railway expansion project, one of the key elements 
identified in The Big Move. The Georgetown South railway expansion also included widening 
the former two-track railway to four tracks, with a total of eight tracks where the Milton line and 
Barrie line share the corridor. The work for the Union-Pearson Express consisted of five new 
road overpasses and two road underpasses, one railway grade separation, one bridge 
reconstruction and the widening of 15 other bridges, construction/re-construction of four 
stations, major track and grading construction, signal installations utility relocations, as well as 
the new 3.3 kilometre spur to and from the airport (GO Transit, 2015). 
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Rolling	  stock	  
The Union-Pearson Express uses Nippon Sharyo Diesel Multiple Unit trains, a diesel-
powered, self-propelled passenger rail car that can respond to local or remote throttle and brake 
commands. Metrolinx initially purchased 12 cars (or more precisely six two-car trains) in March 
2011 at a cost of $53 million but this was later expanded to 18 cars operating as three-car or two-
car sets (Railway Gazette, 2011). The trains are capable of traveling up to 145 km/h, but because 
of the curves on the track, they will operate at 25 km/h in some places and 90 km/h in straight 
areas. The cars were manufactured in Japan, assembled in Chicago, and towed by rail to Toronto 
with the first train set arriving on August 15, 2014 (Union-Pearson Express, 2015). The train sets 
accommodate between 115 and 173 passengers making a total of approximately 140 trips daily. 
On-board features include power outlets, Wi-Fi, luggage facilities, and washrooms.  
 
 
The Union-Pearson Express train at Union Station  
(Source: UP Express, 2015) 
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The Union-Pearson Express cars are based on the design created for the Sonoma-Marin 
Rail Transit system in California. They are powered by a diesel hydraulic drive with a six-speed 
automatic transmission and regenerative braking. These cars are said to be the first ‘clean diesel’ 
trains in the world as they comply with the United States Environmental Protection Agency Tier 
4 emission standards, engineered to reduce some emissions by up to 90 per cent (Kalinowski, 
2015a). The cars also comply with the Federal Railroad Administration’s (an agency in the 
United States Department of Transportation) Tier 1 crash energy management features. Braking 
energy is converted into electricity by the auxiliary power generation and helps to provide 
onboard lighting and heating (Sonoma Marin Area Rail Transit, 2010). 
Fares	  and	  Ridership	  so	  far	  
The price for a one-way adult fare between Union Station and Pearson Airport is $27.50, 
or $19.00 with a Presto card. Otherwise fares range based on age, origin and destination, and the 
method of payment. VIA Rail tickets are also accepted as a form of payment for those travelling 
by train to and from other places in Canada given an interline agreement between Union-Pearson 
Express and VIA Rail. The fares have been criticized for being the most expensive in North 
America and uneconomical for commuters travelling in groups of two or more who would find 
sharing a cab ride cheaper and convenient from most parts of Toronto (Haider, 2015). The 
following chart depicts a breakdown of the Union-Pearson Express fares. 
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The Union-Pearson Express Fare Chart 
(Source: Metrolinx, 2014b) 
 
In its first week of operation, 1,407 out of 1,422 Union-Pearson trips between June 6 and 
14 were completed on schedule giving an average on time performance of 98.9 per cent (Peat, 
2015). Based on feedback from a first impressions survey in the weeks following the launch, 
travellers were very pleased with the speed, reliability, and available amenities, with 87 per cent 
of the respondents very likely to ride Union-Pearson Express again and 85 per cent would 
recommend the service to others (Haley, 2015).  
Metrolinx projected that in its first year of operation the Union-Pearson Express would 
attract around 5,000 riders per day (Peat, 2015). However, according to the grassroots transit 
advocacy group TTCriders, the Union-Pearson Express trains were running nearly empty during 
the Pan Am Games (Bell, 2015). On July 15, 2015, about midway through the Games, TTCriders 
members counted riders exiting and entering the Union-Pearson Express at Pearson Airport 
during the morning rush hour from 7:30 to 9:30 a.m. They observed an average of 14 passengers 
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on average on each train, translating to approximately 8 per cent of the 173 seat capacity (Bell, 
2015). These figures were not too far off the official Metrolinx ridership numbers announced in 
July 2015. A month after opening Metrolinx spokesperson Anne Marie Aikins said that the rail 
link was averaging 3,250 riders a day, or 12 per cent of full capacity (Peat, 2015). Aikins added 
that the ridership so far was nonetheless “on track with ridership predictions” to hit 5,000 a day 
by next year, and that Metrolinx was “very pleased with the numbers so far” (quoted in Peat, 
2015).  
 
 
Empty Union-Pearson Express train on during Pan Am Games on July 15, 2015 
(Source: Bell, 2015) 
 
Ridership has not improved since the summer of 2015. The Union-Pearson Express 
Quarterly Board Report released on September 22, 2015 reveals that the average ridership is 
2,500 passengers a day (Haley, 2015). The report’s author, Union-Pearson Express president 
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Kathy Haley (2015, p. 1) states: “Given that UP Express is a brand new service in the region, we 
are very pleased with ridership so far. Average daily ridership since launch is approximately 
2,500 and is expected to grow until maturity, in the next 3 to 5 years. As we increasingly 
understand our guests and the market, we anticipate that we will reach our daily ridership target 
of 5,000 riders by the end of the first full year of operation.” However, The Globe and Mail 
reporter Oliver Moore (2015) points out that the 2,500 a day ridership figure from the report 
“obscures a grimmer reality revealed by the day-to-day numbers, which weren’t in the report.” 
According to Moore (2015), in order to break even with operating costs, the service needs about 
7,000 riders a day, which Metrolinx aims to reach within three to five years. 
 
5.	  Criticisms	  of	  the	  Union-­‐Pearson	  Express	  
The Union-Pearson Express has generated a considerable amount of criticism for a 
variety of reasons. The following section is a review of news media sources including print 
media such as newspaper and magazine articles, broadcast news including radio and television, 
as well as Internet sources such as blog posts and websites. Based on these sources it appears as 
though the most commonly cited criticisms of the project relate to the high cost of fares, having 
limited stops along the route, and for using diesel trains rather than electric. This section 
examines these three major areas of contention with the subsequent section looking deeper at the 
social and economic implications of the project. 
Fares	  too	  expensive	  	  
One of the most commonly cited concerns with the Union-Pearson Express is that the 
fares are simply too high for most people. The price of a one-way adult ticket between Union 
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Station and Pearson Airport is $27.50 for the 25-minute journey. The price to take the Union-
Pearson Express seems especially exorbitant when compared to other airport-to-downtown direct 
rail services found in other North American cities. It costs $9.00 in Vancouver, $13.61 in New 
York to Newark Airport or $7.50 to John F. Kennedy Airport, and $5.44 in Chicago. Nearly 70 
per cent of respondents in a poll conducted by Forum Research in early August said that the fare 
was too high, with another 25 per cent saying that the price is about right (Forum Research Inc., 
2015). The data comes from an interactive voice response telephone survey where 892 Toronto 
voters were randomly selected. 
 
Poll results regarding the price of fares for the Union-Pearson Express 
(Source: Forum Research Inc., 2015) 
 
Alternative public transportation options to get to and from Pearson Airport include 
taking a TTC or GO Transit bus and these options are significantly cheaper than the Union-
Pearson Express, but much slower given the fact that they share highways with automobile 
traffic. The GO bus service from North York to the airport costs $6.00 for an adult with buses 
running every hour or every 30 minutes during rush hour. To take the TTC there are two daytime 
options to get to and from Pearson Airport. There is the 192 Airport Rocket with only three stops 
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between Kipling Station and Pearson Airport. These buses include luggage racks and take 
approximately 20-25 minutes in travel time with service running every 10 minutes. The other 
option is the 52A bus from Lawrence Station and Lawrence West Station with multiple stops in 
between the airport. This route takes approximately 90 minutes during peak travel times and 70 
minutes during off-peak periods. Cash fare for the TTC is $3.00 including free transfers to or 
from other routes as needed to complete one’s journey. While the TTC and GO buses are 
cheaper, the Union-Pearson Express clearly provides a faster and more reliable transit service as 
the buses may be subject to traffic delays. Nevertheless ridership on the TTC’s Airport Rocket is 
4,500 passengers a day which is nearly double the latest ridership figures for the Union-Pearson 
Express (Kalinowski, 2014).  
The fare to take the Union-Pearson Express may appear to be much more affordable 
when compared to the price of taxicab service to and from Pearson Airport. Cab fares are set by 
the zone travelled to or from in the city but typically cost between $50-60 and take 
approximately 30 minutes for downtown locations. The fares and travel time are even higher for 
locations in the east end of the city. However, the cost of a taxi is per car and not per passenger 
and thus up to four passengers can fit into a standard car paying one fare. Therefore if two or 
more people are travelling to and from the same location, taking a cab is likely to be the cheaper 
option. It is even more affordable to use a ride share service such as Uber where fares are 
generally less than a taxicab.  
Not only are taxicabs more affordable for non-solo travellers, they are easier and more 
convenient for most in the city than taking the Union-Pearson Express. Unless you are within 
walking distance of Union, Weston, or Bloor Stations, passengers of the Union-Pearson Express 
will likely need to use another form of transportation to get to and from the train’s station stops 
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and pay a separate fare. The convenience of having a cab take you from door-to-door is more 
desirable than having to transfer from one line of transit to the next for many people. For those 
visiting the city, taking the Union-Pearson Express followed by a subway or bus can be 
overwhelming when they are not familiar with it. People are often exhausted after a flight and 
want to get to their destination in the easiest way possible, especially if they are carrying 
luggage.  
Limited	  stops	  along	  the	  route	  
The rationale behind having only two stops between downtown and the airport was to 
provide quick and reliable service. According to Diaz (1999), limiting the number of stops and 
planning for higher speed services maximizes accessibility benefits. The original plans for the 
rail link prior to the Metrolinx takeover was that Bloor Station would be the only interim stop 
between Union Station and Pearson Airport. After strong opposition from the Weston 
community, a second interim stop was added at Weston GO Station in order to make the project 
more appealing and beneficial to the residents. The Weston Community Coalition, a residents 
organization formed in 2005 in opposition to the Air Rail Link, called for a 10-stop rapid-transit 
subway line built between Pearson Airport and Union Station to provide public transportation for 
the hundreds of thousands of residents in the western part of the city (Wyatt, 2005). Rather, the 
Union-Pearson Express was designed to be a luxury express service and not a commuter line. For 
this reason the project is criticized for having a marginal impact on addressing traffic congestion 
in the Greater Toronto Area and wasting transit funds that should have gone to projects that 
would deliver a higher increase in transit ridership (Haider, 2015). Nevertheless building a 
commuter line with multiple stops along the route to and from Pearson Airport was nearly 
impossible with the timeline set by the Pan Am Games.  
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Diesel	  locomotives	  
It surprised many when it was announced that a new railway line opening in 2015 would 
be using diesel trains, given everything now known about the environmental dangers of fossil 
fuels and the availability of clean energy sources. The use of diesel fuel for the Union-Pearson 
Express has been a contentious issue generating significant criticism towards the project. Diesel 
is a non-renewable energy source that exhausts a complex mixture of gas and fine particles. The 
primary pollutants from diesel fuel are particulate matter, carbon monoxide, nitrogen oxides, 
hydrocarbons, volatile organic compounds as well as other hazardous air pollutants. Despite the 
warnings by Toronto’s Medical Officer of Health and the 2012 World Health Organization’s 
report putting diesel exhaust in the same deadly league of carcinogens as arsenic, asbestos and 
mustard gas (Schein and Cash, 2013), Metrolinx opted for diesel trains because there was not 
enough time to build an electric train line in time for the Pan Am Games. 
The Pan Am Games set a clear deadline for the Union-Pearson Express project to be 
completed, as the rail link would be necessary to accommodate the influx of visitors during the 
event. Metrolinx president Gary McNeil announced in 2010 that there would be no way that the 
project could be electrified in less than five years and said, “The simple message [is] it can’t be 
electrified in time for the Pan Am Games” (quoted in Grant, 2010). McNeil argued it would be 
impossible to complete an environmental assessment, obtain the approvals to build a hydro 
substation to power the line, and construct and test the system before 2015 (Grant, 2010). 
Metrolinx defended its decision to use diesel trains by stating that it selected “state of the art Tier 
4 diesel; the cleanest diesel option available” (Metrolinx, 2014a, p. 3). Metrolinx also said that it 
plans on converting the diesel trains to electric in the future. While the trains may be ‘the 
cleanest option available’ for diesel, they still produce harmful pollutants that are detrimental to 
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the environment and the health of Toronto residents, especially those living along the rail 
corridor. 
Exposure to diesel exhaust has been linked to cancer and respiratory diseases. Studies 
have found that railway workers, truck drivers, heavy equipment operators, and professional 
drivers have an increased risk of developing cancer from exposure to diesel exhaust. Moreover, a 
study by the University of Washington found that homes near rail lines face increased exposure 
to harmful microscopic particles from diesel emissions (Hoekstra, 2014) and thus residents in 
these areas are more likely to develop related diseases. Aware of the health risks involved with 
diesel trains, residents along the Kitchener-Georgetown rail corridor in the west end of Toronto 
formed the Clean Train Coalition in April of 2009 in response to Metrolinx's plans for the 
Georgetown South Service Expansion and the Union-Pearson rail link. In 2012 the Clean Train 
Coalition took Metrolinx to the Ontario Divisional Court arguing that Metrolinx had no business 
ordering new diesel trains for the Union-Pearson Express prior to completing a feasibility study 
on electrifying the line (Kalinowski, 2012a). Metrolinx’s lawyer John Laskin said that the 
agency was legally bound to follow the government’s direction and argued that Metrolinx was 
authorized to proceed with an order for the diesel trains based on government approvals and the 
identification of the airport rail link as a priority in The Big Move Regional Transportation Plan 
(Kalinowski, 2012b). Ultimately the case was dismissed and the Clean Train Coalition was 
ordered to pay Metrolinx $30,000 in costs. 
Diesel trains are noisier than electric which is another major area of concern for residents 
living along the rail corridor. In order to mitigate noise impacts on the adjacent residential 
communities, the province constructed five-metre tall noise walls along the route as required. 
Many residents have expressed outrage that the walls divide their communities, break up the 
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urban forest, and become canvasses for graffiti (Schein and Cash, 2013). Residents also opposed 
the walls for being an eyesore for their communities. In 2013, members of the Junction Triangle 
Rail Committee and Wabash Building Society hired award-winning landscape architects James 
Brown and Kim Storey to draft an alternative plan. The proposal was called “Sharing 
Boundaries” where the noise barrier walls would be ‘green walls’ with vegetation growing inside 
metal caging intermingled with 10,000 trees along the rail corridor as well as seven new 
pedestrian bridges that would connect linear park pathways on each side of the tracks (Ballingall, 
2013). The proposal maintained that if the concrete walls are deemed to be necessary than the 
green walls could go beside them to improve aesthetics. In response to the green wall proposal, 
Metrolinx spokesperson Manuel Pedrosa defended that the five-metre barriers are mandated by 
the Ministry of Transportation and that Metrolinx does not own enough room to implement a 
green wall or park space in many places along the corridor (Ballingall, 2013).  
 
 
 “Sharing Boundaries” proposal for green walls along the Union-Pearson Express rail corridor 
(Source: Brown + Storey Architects Inc., retrieved from Ballingall, 2013). 
 
	   41 
The “Sharing Boundaries” proposal never came into fruition and to make matters worse 
for the residents, Metrolinx had originally promised that all noise walls would be complete when 
the Union-Pearson Express service opened on June 6. However, in May it was announced that 
only the noise walls that are required to launch the Union-Pearson Express would be completed 
on time. Metrolinx spokesperson Anne Marie Aikins said that the additional noise walls, 
including in the MacDonell Avenue area, were “delayed by harsh weather and also because some 
residents didn’t want certain trees cut down. So we had to stop work [and] regroup” (quoted in 
Pom, 2015). 
In a June 2015 interview, Metrolinx CEO Bruce McCuiag was asked, “Is there a date and 
money on the table to retrofit this dirty diesel to clean efficient electric before carcinogens 
infiltrate the air of Toronto residents?” (quoted in Kalinowski, 2015b). McCuiag responded, 
“The recent provincial budget set aside funding for Regional Express Rail, which includes 
electrification of the corridors, including UPX. We are folding the UPX electrification into the 
electrification of the Kitchener corridor as far as Bramalea, and we expect electrification to start 
being operational on five of the lines in 2023” (quoted in Kalinowski, 2015b). The provincial 
government announced in April 2015 that it would be investing billions of dollars to the 
improvement and electrification of Regional Express Rail, which includes the Union-Pearson 
Express. However, no specific funding has been committed to the converting the Union-Pearson 
Express trains. With trains departing every 15 minutes, seven days a week, the Union-Pearson 
Express will emit a lot of air pollution before it is retrofitted and electrified in eight years at the 
very earliest. 
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6.	  The	  Winners	  and	  Losers	  of	  Pan	  Am	  and	  the	  Union-­‐Pearson	  Express	  	  
When Toronto won the bid to host the 2015 Pan American Games back in 2009, many 
regarded it as a victory for the city after Toronto had unsuccessfully bid to host the Olympic 
Games. The 2015 Pan Am Games are generally regarded as a success for running smoothly and 
coming in on budget. In regard to meeting the budget for the Pan Am Games, Tourism, Culture 
and Sport Minister Michael Coteau said, “I can say with confidence that we did what we set out 
to do” adding, “[w]e successfully delivered the largest, most transparent multi-sport games ever 
held in this country” (quoted in Benzie and Ferguson, 2015). Toronto’s success in hosting the 
Pan American Games opened up the discussion by city officials and the Canadian Olympic 
Committee as to whether a bid should be made for Toronto to host the 2024 Summer Olympic 
Games. Hosting the Olympics in Toronto would be more feasible now than ever before thanks to 
changes to the Olympic philosophy and bidding process announced by the International Olympic 
Committee in December 2014. Among these changes was a decision “to actively promote the 
maximum use of existing facilities” and the use of temporary venues (quoted in Hunter, 2015). 
This statement means that the venues built for the Pan Am Games may not have initially met the 
International Olympic Committee requirements but they could be adapted to comply under the 
new approach (Hunter, 2015). While it was seriously considered, mayor John Tory announced in 
September 2015 that Toronto would not be making an Olympic bid citing tight timelines, a lack 
of private sector interest, and issues getting commitments from senior governments. 
Hosting a major sporting event can bring a variety of economic benefits to a city which is 
why Toronto sought to host the Pan American Games. When it bid for the games in 2009, the 
provincial government produced an economic impact analysis that concluded that the Pan 
American Games would grow Ontario’s real GDP by $3.7 billion and would create 26,000 jobs 
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from 2009 to 2017 (Government of Ontario, 2015b). Moreover, the province predicted that a 
quarter of a million visitors would come to Toronto for the Games boosting the local economy 
by increasing sales and revenue for hotels, tourist attractions, restaurants and shops (Government 
of Ontario, 2015b). Sources estimate that the Pan Am Games ended up attracting 1.4 million 
visitors to the Greater Toronto Area (Benzie and Ferguson, 2015). 
Another reason that cities desire to host a mega-event is because it encourages investment 
in infrastructure and transit improvement. Staging a mega-event usually requires upgrades to 
transport links to reduce congestion and help to improve efficiency for local businesses and 
residents, and this investment in transport infrastructure leaves a lasting legacy for the whole 
economy. The Pan Am Games catalyzed many infrastructure development projects such as the 
new stadium built in Hamilton and the redevelopment of the former industrial West Don Lands 
to create a mixed-use development and the site of the athletes’ village. The Pan Am Games can 
also be regarded positively for fast-tracking the completion of the Union-Pearson Express after it 
had been stalled for so many years. The infrastructure created for, or accelerated by the Games, 
will strengthen Toronto’s bid to host another mega-event if it chooses to do so in the future.  
While the Pan Am Games may be regarded as a success, how do we measure and 
evaluate the success of the infrastructure built for the games, specifically the Union-Pearson 
Express? If it were not for the Pan Am Games setting a deadline for the completion of the Union-
Pearson Express, who knows how many more years it would take before a rail link would be 
built. In a city that has made little investment in transit over recent decades, the Union-Pearson 
Express brought a glimpse of hope that if Toronto wants transit, it can have transit, and it does 
not need to take decades to build. North American cities similar to the size of Toronto have long 
had rapid transit options connecting the city centre to the airport while Toronto’s was only built 
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in 2015. Thus, the Pan Am Games can be commended for successfully accelerating a much-
needed piece of transit infrastructure for Toronto. In 2014, Pearson Airport handled 38,572,416 
passengers averaging to approximately 105,600 passengers a day and employs approximately 
40,000 people (Greater Toronto Airports Authority, 2015). It is the busiest airport in Canada and 
second busiest in North America after John F. Kennedy International Airport in New York City. 
With so many travellers using Pearson Airport it is easy to see why the Union-Pearson Express 
was considered a priority project that needed to be completed prior to the Pan Am Games, as it 
was expected that there would be an influx of visitors coming to Toronto through Pearson 
Airport for the Games. Completing the Union-Pearson Express on time for the Pan Am Games 
and after it had been delayed for so many years may be hailed as a victory in some sense. The 
victory, however, is only short-term in meeting the objectives of the Pan American Games. The 
anticipated breakeven after three to five years of operation appears extremely doubtful as the 
ridership levels are likely to continue to be much lower than expected. 
The poor ridership figures can be attributed to the high fares, for not being better 
integrated with existing transit infrastructure and for having limited stops along the route, 
making the service inconvenient and inaccessible for many. It will very likely not breakeven on 
operations after three to five years and will thus be a financial burden for Ontario taxpayers 
without meeting the needs of its residents. From a planning perspective, the Union-Pearson 
Express was a missed opportunity for improving regional transit in the Greater Toronto Area. It 
is failing to attract the ridership necessary to meet the objectives of the Regional Transportation 
Plan, The Big Move, in reducing automobile dependency and road traffic congestion (Metrolinx, 
2008). The fares alone are enough to deter many Torontonians from using the service. It is 
convenient largely for single passengers travelling to or from downtown hotels and businesses. 
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Even if the Union-Pearson Express met Metrolinx’s ridership expectations at 5,000 passengers a 
day within the first year of operation, this would only have a marginal impact on reducing traffic 
congestion in the Greater Toronto Area. The overcrowded King Street streetcar in downtown 
Toronto, by comparison, carries in excess of 65,000 daily riders (Haider, 2015). Had the Union-
Pearson Express been planned to have more stops and connect to more neighbourhoods, the 
ridership numbers would likely be much higher and noticeably reduce traffic congestion on both 
the roads and the TTC.  
Shortcuts were taken on the project in order to have the train service up and running in 
time for the Pan Am Games. In addition to only having two interim stops, the most obvious and 
controversial shortcut was the use of diesel locomotives because an electric train system could 
not be built in time for Pan Am. While the province has announced that the electrification of the 
Union-Pearson Express is a priority transit project, it is estimated that the electrification will only 
start being operational in 2023 at the earliest (Kalinowski, 2015b), assuming available funding. 
The retrofitting of the trains from diesel to electric will presumably be a costly endeavour and an 
expense that could have been avoided if the Union-Pearson Express was done right in the first 
place, meaning, electric trains from the outset. 
The other “losers” here are the communities that fought against the proposed plans of the 
Union-Pearson Express and ultimately lost. The neighbourhoods surrounding the Union-Pearson 
Express rail corridor wanted the line to have more stops and be more of a commuter service so 
that it would benefit the transit needs of local communities. Community groups in the Weston 
and Junction Triangle neighbourhoods also fought and lost against the use of diesel trains and the 
construction of unattractive noise barrier walls. When the Union-Pearson Express trains became 
operational the noise walls were not yet completed along the route. Residents living along the 
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corridor complained about the warning bells that ring when a train is pulling into a station. With 
train service running every 15 minutes, the Union-Pearson Express bells sound an average of 
once every seven and a half minutes around stops, and some people living near the Bloor GO 
Station have said that the noise is keeping them up at night (Spurr, 2015). In response to the 
noise complaints from the bells, Metrolinx manager of community relations Manuel Pedrosa 
said, “[a]t Metrolinx, safety is our number one priority; safety of our passengers, our neighbours, 
and our workers” (quoted in Spurr, 2015). He added that while “there’s no question that we 
regret the inconvenience” the bell ringing has caused, “it’s a Transport Canada regulation. We’re 
required to follow it” (quoted in Spurr, 2015).  
 
7.	  Concluding	  Remarks	  	  
This research paper has attempted to shed light on how a mega-event can act as a catalyst 
for the acceleration of infrastructure development projects using Toronto as a case study. It has 
long been recognized that Toronto, like other major cities, needed a rail link connecting it’s 
downtown and primary airport. However, the Union-Pearson Express was implemented in a 
timeframe to meet the short-term objective of completion for the Pan American Games with the 
long-term costs associated with underutilization, diesel trains rather than electric, and limited 
stops along the route.  
Major infrastructure projects, or mega-projects, constructed in relation to an international 
event often become legacies to the host city once the event has ended. The urban legacies that 
mega-events can create in cities have incited massive investments, promised long-term benefits 
for residents, and are one of the main reasons why citizens are supportive of the bid. Though the 
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Union-Pearson Express was not solely built for the purpose of the Pan Am Games, it is certainly 
a legacy of it. The lesson to be realized from this case study is that in order to be successful, a 
city needs to use a mega-event to achieve its own set of long-term objectives. Otherwise the 
project will be a missed opportunity for urban regeneration and leave behind a white elephant 
instead of a valued legacy for the host city. 
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